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MCQUEEN V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
COUNCIL: MISINTERPRETING L UCAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has experienced much difficulty over the
years formulating useful and cohesive rules of law for interpreting the last line
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, specifically, that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."1 The difficulty stems from the Court's attempt to identify when
a governmental regulation of property-use is so severe that it amounts to a
"regulatory taking" of property, triggering a governmental duty to pay just
compensation. The hardships do not end with the United States Supreme Court,
but grow exponentially as state and lower federal courts try to interpret the law
as set forth by the Supreme Court in this complex field of takings law.2
Confusion arises even when the Supreme Court explicitly creates a "per se"
category of regulatory takings, as the Court did in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council? Lucas held, as a categorical matter, that just compensation
for the loss of value in property is required when a regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.4 Unfortunately, the state and
lower federal courts have interpreted this holding to have two different and
inconsistent meanings.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See generally Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the US. Supreme
Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB.
LAw. 307 (1998) (critiquing the Court's inability to provide useful and useable law in the takings
law area).
3. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
4. Id. at 1015.
5. For cases finding that Lucas did create a "per se" category, see Palm Beach Isles Assocs.
v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen the analysis.. reveals that the
regulatory imposition has deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the property (a
'categorical taking'), then the only remaining issue is the Government's defense .... (citations
omitted)); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("If a
regulation categorically prohibits all economically beneficial use of land... [t]here is, without
more, a compensable taking." (footnotes omitted)); Balough v. Fairbanks N. StarBorough, 995
P.2d 245, 265 (Alaska 2000). But see Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("Reasonable, investment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory takings
case." (emphasis added)); Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, No. 1D99-1764, 2000 WL 889840,
at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 6, 2000) (establishing that a "total taking" requires demonstration
of interference with reasonable, distinct, investment-backed expectations); McQueen v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 74, 530 S.E.2d 628, 633 (2000), petition for cert. filed, 69
U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2000) (No. 00-285) (stating that a successful takings claim must
include proof that regulation interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations).
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South Carolina courts have contributed to the confusion. Recently, in
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council," the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that when a governmental regulation deprives a landowner of all
economically viable use of his land, the landowner still must prove he had
distinct, investment-backed expectations to establish that the regulation has
"taken" his property.7 The Supreme Court in Lucas did not say that proof of
distinct, investment-backed expectations was necessary to establish a taking
under its per se rule for those regulations that destroy all economically viable
use of land. The court in McQueen nonetheless believed that such proof is
necessary and suggested that the Supreme Court in Lucas did not mention the
need for proof of investment-backed expectations because the property owner
in Lucas so clearly had such expectations.'
This Note proposes that the South Carolina Supreme Court has
misinterpreted Lucas. The Lucas court failed to mention the distinct,
investment-backed expectations factor in its analysis not because it was so
obvious that those expectations existed, but because investment-backed
expectations do not have to exist in order for a regulation denying all
economically productive use of land to be deemed a taking.9 In short, as most
courts outside of South Carolina have recognized, the Court in Lucas meant
exactly what it said: If a regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land, then "[t]here is, without more, a compensable taking."'"
The only exception to this principle is the one that the Lucas Court made
explicit: A taking will be found only if the proscribed-use interests that the
regulation removes were originally part of the landowner's title to begin with. "
Part II of this Note provides a background for the issues involved in McQueen
by briefly discussing the modem history of regulatory takings law, from the
1978 decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to the
1992 decision of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Part III examines
Lucas and the inconsistencies between the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision and the majority view of the precedent set by Lucas. Part IV reviews
misinterpretations of the Lucas case, including the South Carolina Supreme
Court's analysis in reaching its decision inMcQueen v. South Carolina Coastal
6. 340 S.C. 65, 530 S.E.2d 628 (2000).
7. Id. at 74, 530 S.E.2d at 633.
8. Id.
9. The investment-backed expectations factor was first introduced in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) and has since been "a frequently invoked dictum
in takings opinions." 9 THOMPSONON REALPROPERTY, § 81.04(e), at488 (David A. Thomas ed.,
2d Thomas ed. 1999).
10. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added).
11. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). For example, no taking
occurs when a regulation destroys all economically viable use of land merely by preventing
common law nuisances. A.B.A. SECTION OF STATE AND LocAL GOV'T LAW, TAKINGS: LAND-
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Council. Part V applies the per se takings test to the facts of McQueen. This
Note concludes by suggesting that the highest court in South Carolina
misinterpreted Lucas by requiring a landowner to prove distinct investment-
backed expectations even when land subjected to a governmental regulation no
longer has any economic value.
II. BACKGROUND
A regulatory taking is not technically a "taking" at all." In a regulatory
taking, the government is not physically taking the land from the landowner;
rather a regulatory taking may occur when the government enacts a regulation
that limits the use of the land by its owner in some way. In the landmark case
of Penn Central Transportation v. City ofNew York, the Court developed the
modem regulatory takings test by identifying "several factors that have
particular significance."' 3
The Court adopted three factors that became the foundation of the
regulatory takings law test: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.'4 The first factor
is usually determinative. 5 The regulation in question must have "a dramatic
impact on the value of the property" to amount to a taking.'6 The second factor,
distinct investment-backed expectations, protects the government from having
to compensate a landowner who did not buy the land in reliance on the absence
of the regulation.17 In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,"8 the court
explained the legal and economic justifications for the expectations factor:
In legal terms, the owner who bought with knowledge of the
restraint could be said to have no reliance interest, or to have
assumed the risk of any economic loss. In economic terms, it
could be said that the market had already discounted for the
restraint, so that a purchaser could not show a loss in his
investment attributable to it.'9
12. See generally 9 THOMPSON, supra note 9, ch. 81 (examining the complex field of
regulatory takings law).
13. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
14. Id. at 124-25.
15. See DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING
TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 25 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 1177. For a complete examination of this factor, see Robert M. Washburn,
"Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations" as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63 (1996).
2001]
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In examining the third factor, the character ofthe governmental action, a taking
can more readily be found if the action can be characterized as a physical
invasion by the government than if the regulation, even though causing
hardship to one individual, is for the public good.2" The character of the
governmental-action factor implicitly balances private interests and the public
good.21 According to Penn Central, under any regulatory-takings case these
three factors determine whether a taking has occurred.'
In 1992, the Supreme Court modified the Penn Central regulatory takings
test by creating an important distinction between regulations that deprive a
landowner of all economically viable use of the land and regulations that
deprive less than all economically viable use of the land.' Also, the Supreme
Court added an exception or defense in favor of the government called the
background principles defense.24 If a regulation deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial or productive use of land, then a taking has occurred
unless the government can prove that a background principle of nuisance or
property law could have prohibited the proscribed use before the regulation was
enacted.' If the regulation has not deprived a landowner of all economically
beneficial or productive use of land, the background principles defense is still
available to the government and the factors of Penn Central will be analyzed
to determine if a taking has occurred.26
I. LUCAS: CREATION OF A PER SE TAKING
A. Analysis
The Lucas case arose out of a landowner's failed attempts to obtain the
permits necessary to build on his property.27 Lucas bought two residential lots
on a South Carolina barrier island with the intention of building single-family
homes.28 After he had bought the land, the state enacted a regulation that barred
Lucas (and other similarly-situated landowners) from erecting any permanent,
habitable structures on the two residential lots. 29 Lucas challenged the
regulation in state court, where it was found that the regulation deprived the
land of all economically viable use.30 However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court found that when a regulation is designed to prevent serious public harm,
20. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
21. KENDALLETAL.,supra note 15, at 26.
22. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
23. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992).
24. Id. at 1027.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1019-20 n.8.
27. Id. at 1003.
28. Id. at 1006-07.
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then no compensation is due regardless of the effect of the regulation on the
value of the property."
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the
South Carolina Supreme Court and concluded that when a regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land, a landowner has suffered a
taking requiring just compensation. In its analysis, the Court decided to give
categorical treatment to the situation in which a landowner has been deprived
of all economically viable use of his land by governmental regulation.3 The
Court equated a total deprivation of land use with physical invasion; "no matter
how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose
behind it, [the Court] ha[s] required compensation."' The Court's rationale was
that a governmental regulation "requiring land to be left substantially in its
natural state [presents] a heightened risk that private property is being pressed
into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm." The Court explicitly found that compensation is unnecessary only
when the landowner's bundle of rights do not include the right that the
regulation is allegedly taking away.36 Allowing the state to take away all value
in a parcel of land without just compensation is inconsistent with the Takings
Clause of the Constitution."
Apparently creating a per se takings rule, the Court did not explicitly
address the Penn Central requirement of investment-backed expectations in its
analysis, but the requirement was mentioned in two footnotes of the majority
opinion. 8 In footnote seven the Court acknowledged the situation where land
has not been completely diminished in its value and recognized that the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations may be examined. 9
However, the Court refused to elaborate since the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas found that the regulation left Lucas with land that had no
economic value and so that type of situation was not presented by the case.'
In footnote eight the Court acknowledged Justice Stevens' criticism of the
categorical taking as "'wholly arbitrary' because the "'landowner whose
property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing,' while the landowner
who suffers a complete elimination of value 'recovers the land's full value."Al
The Court reminded Justice Stevens that even though a landowner who has not
31. Id. at 1010.
32. Id. at 1019. The case was remanded to state court and the only way South Carolina
could prevail was to prove that background principles of nuisance and property law prohibited
the uses Lucas intended for the property. Id. at 1031.
33. Id. at 1015.
34. Id.
35. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 1027.
37. Id. at 1028.
38. Id. at 1017 n.7, 1019 n.8.
39. Id. at 1016-17 n.7.
40. Id.
41. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 n.8 (citation omitted).
2001]
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suffered a complete loss of economically viable use of her land cannot claim
the benefit of the categorical formulation, such a landowner can still use the
general regulatory takings test espoused in Penn Central, which includes
consideration of a property owner's distinct investment-backed expectations
requirement4
A logical interpretation of the Court's opinion taken as a whole leaves one
to conclude, using the very words of the Court, that "when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle,
he has suffered a taking."43
B. Precedential Value of Lucas in Other Jurisdictions
Many courts and commentators have recognized that Lucas has created a
distinct category of regulatory takings in which examining investment-backed
expectations is unnecessary.' While courts frequently cite Lucas, courts
infrequently find it applicable because regulation rarely deprives a landowner
of all economically viable use of property.4s In Bowles v. United States," the
court followed the total deprivation rule under Lucas and found that the
landowner had suffered a taking requiring just compensation.4" The plaintiff
applied for a permit to fill his wetland lot so he could install a septic system
required by his subdivision, but the Army Corps of Engineers denied the
permit." He alleged that he had lost all economically viable use of his property
because without the fill he would be unable to construct a home.49 The court
then determined whether the economic impact of the regulation resulted in total
diminution of the value of the property by comparing the fair market value of
the property before the alleged taking with the fair market value of the property
after the alleged taking.5" The court concluded that "[w]hen, as in this case, a
single owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1019 (footnote omitted).
44. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Maritrans, Inc. v.
United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790,793 (Fed. Cl. 1998); Balough v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995
P.2d 245, 265 (Alaska 2000); KENDALL ET AL., supra note 15, at 192; Michael K. Braswell &
Stephen L. Poe, Private Property vs. Federal Wetlands Regulation: ShouldPrivate Landowners
Bear the Cost of Wetlands Protection?, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 197, 199-200 (1995).
45. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 523,543-48 (1995).
46. 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
47. Id. at 53.
48. Id. at40.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 46-49.
[Vol. 52: 815
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beneficial use of his land, in this case his future homestead, in the name of the
common good he has suffered a taking."'"
In City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen 2 the Florida District Court of Appeals
construed Lucas similarly.53 The owner of an apartment complex sued for
compensation after the city ordered the closure of the complex based on
evidence of tenant drug use.' The court noted that if the closure "resulted in
depriving the owner of all economic use of the property ... then as a matter
of law there is deemed to have been a taking and the property owner is entitled
to be compensated for the economic loss suffered."55' Both of these cases
demonstrate the precedential worth of Lucas intended by the Supreme Court.
IV. MV[ISINTERPRETATIONS
Some courts have inferred that the Supreme Court's omission of the
investment-backed expectation factor from the per se test was an oversight,
because in Lucas investment-backed expectations clearly existed.
A. Good v. United States
In McQueen the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on Good v. United
States, a United States Court of Appeals decision.56 Good, the landowner,
purchased wetlands property in the Florida Keys in 1973s5 and spent many
years obtaining the proper permits from federal, state, and local governments. 8
Good was granted a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1988,
but, due to a permit denial from another agency, he resubmitted a new, scaled
down version of his development plan to the Corps of Engineers in 1990.
5
1
However, between 1988 and 1990, the Lower Keys marsh rabbit and silver rice
rat were listed as endangered species.' Therefore, the Fish and Wildlife
Service recommended to the Corps that Good's permit application be denied.6'
51. Id. at 53 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)). The court
did mention reasonable investment-backed expectations, but only assumed arguendo that the
landowner's sacrifice was less than total. Id.
52. 675 So.2d 626 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996).
53. Id. at 629.
54. Id. at 627-28.
55. Id. at 629.
56. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The South Carolina Supreme Court is not the only
court that has relied on Good. The Florida District Court of Appeals found that a claimant must
demonstrate investment-backed expectations in order to establish a claim for a compensable
regulatory "total" taking. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, No. 1D99-1764, 2000 WL 889840,
at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 6,2000).
57. Good, 189 F.3d at 1357.
58. Id. at 1357-59.
59. Id. at 1358-59.
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The Corps denied Good's permit application and informed him that his 1988
permit had expired.62 Good then filed suit alleging that the permit denial was
anuncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.' In determining
whether a taking had occurred, the court ruled that reasonable, investment-
backed expectations are an element of every regulatory takings case." The
court in Good admitted that the Supreme Court in Lucas set out a categorical
takings rule, but the Good court found that "[a] Lucas-type taking... is
categorical only in the sense that the courts do not balance the importance of
the public interest advanced by the regulation against the regulation's
imposition on private property rights."" s The Good court reasoned that those
who purchase property already subject to development restrictions would
receive windfalls because purchase prices are discounted to reflect
development risks.' According to Good, when a landowner has been deprived
of all economically viable use in his land, the test to determine whether a taking
has occurred would be the same three-prong test created in Penn Central with
only a modification of the third element, the character of the governmental
action.67 The court in Good was treading on dangerous ground to infer that
Lucas included an element that the Court did not discuss. The United States
Supreme Court made it quite clear in its opinion that under this per se category
of takings, "when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.""
B. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council
1. Facts and Procedural History
The South Carolina Supreme Court followed the erroneous interpretation
of Lucas in McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council. The McQueen case
arose out of a landowner's failed efforts to obtain the necessary permits to
improve his land.69 After the permits were denied, he sued the state claiming
that its denial of the permits rendered his land worthless and amounted to a
62. Id. at 1359.
63. Good, 189 F.3d at 1359.
64. Id. at 1360. Notice that the court inMcQueen refers to investment-backed expectations
as "distinct" while the court in Good uses the term "reasonable." Penn Central introduced the
requirement as "distinct," yet the Court, a few years later, referred to investment-backed
expectations as "reasonable." Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980). As
one commentator put it, "[n]o one seemed to notice, or care, that 'distinct' expectations had
turned to 'reasonable' ones." 9 THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 488.
65. Good, 189 F.3d at 1361 (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
69. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 68, 530 S.E.2d 628, 630 (2000).
[Vol. 52:815
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taking requiring just compensation."0 McQueen purchased two, unimproved
lots in North Myrtle Beach in 1961, which are located on manmade, saltwater
canals created by fill.' In July 1991, McQueen applied to the South Carolina
Coastal Council for a permit to construct bulkheads on these two lots to prevent
further erosion on his and his neighbor's property.72 The Coastal Council issued
a permit for one lot, but due to confusion on the part of another agency
involved in the permitting process, no action was taken on the other lot.73 To
correct the confusion, McQueen resubmitted the applications only to have both
permits denied because the proposed bulkheads were located within the
tidelands critical area.74 The permits McQueen sought were prohibited by a
South Carolina Regulation75 that provides in part, "[t]he creation of commercial
and residential lots strictly for private gain is not a legitimate justification for
the filling of wetlands. Permit applications for the filling of wetlands and
submerged lands for these purposes shall be denied, except for erosion
control."76 This regulation was enacted after McQueen had purchased the
property. McQueen appealed the denial of the permits to the Coastal Council,
then to the Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel, and both bodies upheld
the denial.7 McQueen sought review in circuit court, which referred the case
to the master-in-equity who found that McQueen had suffered a taking because
the Coastal Council's refusal to grant the permits denied him of all
economically beneficial use of his property.79 A divided court of appeals
affirmed the master's ruling, finding that McQueen had suffered a "textbook
regulatory taking."8 The supreme court subsequently reversed the court of
appeals.
81
2. The Court's Analysis
The critical point that the South Carolina Supreme Court noted in its
discussion was that "[i]t is uncontested the permit denial at issue here deprives
respondent of all economically viable use of his property."8 2 Yet, the court
70. Id.
71. Id. at 67, 530 S.E.2d at 629-30.
72. Id. at 67, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
73. ML
74. Id. at 67-68, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
75. 23A S.C. CODE ANN. RaGs. 30-12-(G)(2)(a) (Supp. 1999).
76. Id. In its opinion, the court left out the exception in the regulation for erosion control.
The court did not discuss why McQueen did not fall into this exception because McQueen's
reason for constructing the bulkhead was to prevent further erosion on his and his neighbors'
property.
77. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 68, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. McQueen, 329 S.C. at 600,496 S.E.2d at 650.
81. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 77, 530 S.E.2d at 635.
82. Id. at 69, 530 S.E.2d at 631.
2001]
9
Lee: McQueen v. South Carolina Costal Council: Misinterpreting Lucas
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
continued and applied a three-prong test to determine whether McQueen could
recover on a regulatory takings claim. According to the court, a property owner
can recover on a regulatory takings claim if:
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the
property as a result of the regulatory imposition; (2) the
property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations;
and (3) the interest taken was vested in the owner, as a matter
of state property law, and not within the power of the state to
regulate under common law nuisance doctrine."
The supreme court found that the court of appeals erred by failing to address
the second prong of the regulatory-takings test:
In order to recover on a takings claim, a property owner must
establish the regulation interfered with his distinct,
investment-backed expectations. Without the requirement of
investment-backed expectations, a property owner could
obtain a windfall by claiming a taking in the face of new
regulations, without any real intent to develop. This issue was
not discussed in Lucas as there was no question David Lucas
had distinct investment-backed expectations."
In identifying this supposed error, the court relied on Good v. United States.85
The court in McQueen admitted that the facts of the two cases were quite
different, but found that the underlying principle was the same.85 The court held
that McQueen did not suffer a taking of property without just compensation
because he failed to demonstrate that he had distinct, investment-backed
expectations.87 He lacked these expectations, according to the court, because
the beachfront property had been the subject of at least some developmental
regulations since 1899.88 Thus, the court implicitly stated that any buyer of
beachfront property since 1899 could not have investment-backed expectations.
83. Id. at 69, 530 S.E.2d at630-31 (citingLoveladiesHarbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994). One argument raised by Amici Curiae is that the public trust
doctrine is a background principle of state law which could bar a property owner from
backfilling wetlands. Id. at 70 n.2, 530 S.E.2d at 631 n.2. In South Carolina the state owns, as
part of the public trust, property below the high watermark of a navigable stream. Id. The court
declined to address this issue because it was not raised in the lower courts, and the court reversed
on other grounds. Id.
84. Id. at 74, 530 S.E.2d at 633 (citations omitted).
85. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
86. McQueen, 340 S.C. 65, 76, 530 S.E.2d 628, 634.
87. Id. at 77, 530 S.E.2d at 635.
88. Id. at 76, 530 S.E.2d at 634. In 1899 a federal statute was enacted that required a
landowner to obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers before developing a wetland
area. See Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
[Vol. 52: 815
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The court further noted McQueen's failure to seekpermits to develop the land
for so long after buying the property. 9
The court's argument that the landowner would receive a windfall in a
situation like McQueen's is also flawed. A landowner has little chance of
obtaining a windfall when he has been denied all economically viable use of
his land. The court's concerns that landowners, in order to gain a profit from
the government, would purposely own land with no intent to develop, hoping
that a regulation will be enacted to strip away all economic value of the land,
is also misguided. The windfall is avoided when the court or administrative
entity decides what amount will justly compensate the landowner. The proper
measure of just compensation is the property's fair market value," which has
been legally defined as the amount in cash, or on terms reasonably equivalent
to cash, for which, in all probability, the property would be sold by a
knowledgeable owner willing, but not obligated, to sell to a knowledgeable
purchaser who desires but is not obligated to buy.9 The court or administrative
entity undergoes a case-specific inquiry when deciding the property's value by
examining all the relevant attributes that would effect the price a reasonable
buyer would be willing to pay;' thus, the just compensation inquiry avoids a
situation that the South Carolina Supreme Court believes may threaten
regulatory takings law. A landowner will only be compensated an amount he
would have received had he sold the property to a knowledgeable buyer a
second before the taking occurred, hardly receiving a windfall.93
V. APPLYING LUCAS TO THE FACTS OF MCQUEEN
If the South Carolina Supreme Court had followed the test created in Lucas
by the United States Supreme Court, the outcome would have been quite
different. The court would have first determined the economic impact of the
regulation on the land: Did the regulation destroy all economically viable use
of the property? In McQueen the court recognized that the permit denial at
issue deprived the landowner of all economically viable use of the property.94
Since the regulation did destroy all economically viable use of the property,
McQueen should have been entitled to compensation without further analysis
unless the government had been able to prove that common law property or
nuisance law would have prevented McQueen from filling his property and
89. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 76, 530 S.E.2d at 634-35.
90. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (6th ed. 1990).
92. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973).
93. A windfall is defined as "an unanticipated benefit, usu[ally] in the form of aprofit and
not caused by the recipient ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1594 (7th ed. 1999).
94. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 69, 530 S.E.2d at 631.
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constructing a bulkhead.95 Regardless of whether common law background
principles of property and nuisance law permitted construction of a bulkhead,
the first part of the analysis should not have included an inquiry into the
reasonable or distinct investment-backed expectations of McQueen as defined
under the general three-pronged regulatory takings test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Takings law has been described by at least one commentator as "a very
messy collage of strewn concepts and aphorisms that must pass for a rational
jurisprudence." 96 McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council has added to
that messy collage.97 It is highly implausible that the majority of the United
States Supreme Court failed to mention a requirement for a "per se" category
simply because it seemed so obvious under the facts. Coupled with the
expressly-stated explanation in the footnotes of the opinion that the reasonable
investment-backed expectations requirement under the general test of
regulatory takings can still be used in the analysis of a landowner who has not
suffered a complete loss of value in its land, it becomes clear that the United
States Supreme Court did not intend for the "distinct" or "reasonable"
investment-backed expectations test to be a part of the analysis of a landowner
that has lost all economically viable use in his land. The only defense when a
regulation has destroyed all productive and beneficial use in the land is that the
use the regulation prohibits did not inhere in the title itself.9" Unless that
defense can be proven, a taking requiring just compensation has occurred. In
this particular area, the inconsistences and uncertainties will continue to
develop; thus, lawyers and their clients in South Carolina, for now at least,"
will have to prove more than what is necessary under the test explicitly set out
in Lucas.
Nikki Lee
95. See supra note 83. The court did not thoroughly examine this issue because it
erroneously based its decision on the lack of investment-backed expectations.
96. 9 THoMPsoN, supra note 9, § 81.04(i), at 497.
97. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
98. Id. at 1027.
99. A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed on Aug. 22,2000.
See McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65,530 S.E.2d 628 (2000), petition
for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2000) (No. 00-285).
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